Sarah Palin gets it very wrong on Iraq
In the vice presidential debate last Thursday night at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, there was a heated exchange between Senator Joe Biden of Delaware and Alaska Governor Sarah Palin over Iraq. Gov Palin had incorrectly stated that troops levels were now down to pre-surge levels. She echoed Sen McCain's views about success in Iraq but but did not define what success meant or what it would take to achieve that goal. Sen. Biden replied that the Senator Obama had a plan to gradually withdraw troops from Iraq according to a timeline; an idea supported by Iraqi government officials as well. Gov Palin, in the following exchange, responded to the idea of a timeline with a smear:
PALIN: Your plan is a white flag of surrender in Iraq and that is not what our troops need to hear today, that's for sure. And it's not what our nation needs to be able to count on. You guys opposed the surge. The surge worked. Barack Obama still can't admit the surge works.
We'll know when we're finished in Iraq when the Iraqi government can govern its people and when the Iraqi security forces can secure its people. And our commanders on the ground will tell us when those conditions have been met. And Maliki and Talabani also in working with us are knowing again that we are getting closer and closer to that point, that victory that's within sight.
The purpose of the surge was not to have troops in Iraq indefinitely. The purpose of the surge was to stabilize the violence in Iraq so that political progress could be made. Frederick Kagen, one of the authors of the surge policy, explained this in an appearance on the Jim Lehrer Hour on PBS back in March of 2008:
FREDERICK KAGAN: Well, the main purpose of the surge was to get the sectarian violence in and around Baghdad under control so that it would be possible for the Iraqis to start making political progress.
Gov Palin and Senator McCain continuously misstate both the purpose of the surge and what it has accomplished. Sen. McCain, in particular, restates the history and timeline of events in Iraq in order to support his contention that the surge is responsible for the Sunni Awakening in Al Anbar province. This is not so. Senator Kerry, in a speech this past July at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, laid out the real history and conditions in Iraq that have led to a lessening of the violence in that country:
The Anbar Awakening started well before the surge. This is more than just a political gotcha game or yet another instance of Senator McCain getting his facts wrong. To apply counterinsurgency principles on a global scale, we need to draw the right lessons from the surge.
Let's look at exactly what happened. And this is important: the tensions between al Qaeda in Iraq and Sunni leaders in Anbar were already apparent nearly two years before the surge, culminating in the first reported battle between AQI and Sunni militias in the western town of Husaybah in May of 2005. The reason? Al Qaeda's brutality, disrespect for local customs, insistence on marrying local women over the objections of tribal leaders, and disruption of local businesses.
When Colonel Sean MacFarland and his Ready First brigade arrived in Ramadi in June of 2006, al Qaeda was still fully in control. The Ready First immediately saw the need for a change in tactics and-on their own-they launched an extensive outreach campaign to win over the local population-starting with local tribal leaders, to whom they assigned an Arabic-speaking former special forces officer who grew a moustache to gain the locals' trust. They emphasized getting local Iraqi forces out into neighborhoods by deputizing tribal militias.
These efforts culminated on September 9, 2006 - some four months before the surge was even announced -- when a young local sheik, Sittar albu-Risha, created a new Awakening Council and officially declared the Anbar Awakening underway. That created a snowball effect. And, as MacFarland noted, with the 2006 US election approaching "a growing concern that U.S. forces would leave Iraq" made tribal leaders open to our overtures - a not unimportant transformation as we think about leveraged changes in behavior that might come from redeployment of American forces. By late October, nearly every tribe around Ramadi had either joined the Awakening or was openly considering it.
The coming months saw the Awakening Movement, with American help, repel an AQI attack on a friendly sheik in the Battle of Sufia. As security improved, a major campaign was launched to rebuild Ramadi, culminating in the Ramadi Reconstruction Conference in January 2007.
For those of you keeping score, this is the point in the story where the surge begins. President Bush announced the surge on January 10th 2007. In fact, President Bush and Senator McCain both pointed to our success in flipping tribes in Ramadi against AQI as a reason to support the surge.
Let me be clear: there is no question that our troops performed heroically, and did everything that was asked of them and more. And yes, they undoubtedly played a significant role in securing Baghdad and helping to expand the Awakening beyond Anbar Province.
But, the true history of the Awakening is important in drawing the right lessons from the surge. The Iraqis made a political calculation that they didn't like al Qaeda and wanted to work with us. The actions that led to the Awakening reflected our understanding that U.S. military action alone would not defeat the terrorists: we needed to win over the population by co-opting the tribal sheiks, utilizing indigenous security forces, winning the information war, and helping our Iraqi allies deliver goods, services and improved governance.
Moreover, the reduction in violence resulted from many other factors beyond a simple surge of troops. You have to consider Moqtada al Sadr's ceasefire in August 2007, the sectarian segregation of neighborhoods, and the success of Iraqi security forces, with US military support, in taking the streets back from Shia militias, especially in Basra. We also benefitted from the death of al Qaeda in Iraq's leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in a US airstrike.
Certainly, as Senator Kerry has stated, the surge played a part in stabilizing the country. But so did other factors. Sen. McCain and Gov Palin should recognize that and recognize that the Iraqis want a timeline for a reasoned and safe withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. The goal of the surge was to create breathing room for Iraqi politicians to begin to solve their political differences. Stating otherwise is just fixing the facts of what happened in Iraq to fit policies that Iraqis no longer want.

5 comments »