This is a post written by Senator Kerry and cross-posted on Talking Points Memo today.

A New Strategy Against Extremism and Terrorism
By John Kerry - July 31, 2008

I just got back from giving a speech this morning at the Center for American Progress where I tried to lay down a baseline about how you actually win the struggle against radical extremism and terrorism -- and the new mindset required to do it. I wanted to continue the conversation, and TPM graciously agreed to host it here.

Here's the deal -- we don't need a rebranding -- this isn't a semantics game -- we need a wholesale rethinking. Instead of a military-dominated "war on terror," we should be fighting the global counterinsurgency campaign it always should have been. We need to fold our military efforts to capture and kill today's terrorists into a larger "information war" designed to prevent tomorrow's from ever being recruited.

I start from the premise that our current strategy is not working. Five years ago, Donald Rumsfeld famously asked: "Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?" So where are we today? Attacks -- historic highs; Al Qaeda -- reconstituted along the Afghan-Pakistan border. The Taliban -- resurgent. Hamas -- tightening its grip on Gaza. Hezbollah -- running a state within a state in Lebanon. The answer to Rumsfeld's question, I'm afraid, is no -- not by a longshot.

So what does a global counterinsurgency doctrine tell us about the war on terror? What's the correct take-away?

First -- understand the real battlefield. In a local counterinsurgency, the people are the center of gravity and the core objective is to isolate the insurgents by winning the support of the local population. Applied globally, the battlefield is the hearts and minds of the Muslim world. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates said: "We cannot capture and kill our way to victory." He's right. Which is why you fight not just a military battle but an "information war." Frankly, Al Qaeda is fighting an information war - even including an online town hall meeting conducted by Ayman al-Zawahiri.

We need to fight one too.

Second -- Another core principle of counterinsurgency doctrine is that "the more force you use, the less effective it is." Those aren't my words, they're General Petraeus'. And if you read the front page article in today's Washington Post they're pretty damn close to Secretary Gates' words too. Our most important weapons are often non-military: Ironically, some of our military's most significant successes against extremists have actually been humanitarian efforts after an earthquake in Pakistan and a Tsunami in Indonesia.

Third -- legitimacy, legitimacy, legitimacy. Without legitimacy, winning over hearts and minds is impossible. That's why this Administration's embrace of torture and indefinite detention has been so self-defeating. Our enemies have already overreached in places like Anbar and Amman, and we need the moral authority to capitalize on their failures. That starts with shutting down Guantanamo and making clear once and for all that the United States does not torture. Period.

Fourth -- know your enemy. Counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes understanding our enemy. The theorist David Kilcullen has described Al Qaeda as 60 different organizations in 60 different countries, loosely linked by a shared ideology. Taken together, these groups form a global insurgency. The goal of Al Qaeda is to draw these disparate extremists into their broader struggle against the West, sometimes with logistical support, but more broadly by offering a unifying narrative: "Islam under attack."

Fifth -- be nimble. To defeat the enemy, we must adapt as they adapt and tailor our response to circumstances on the ground. In some places, that means development projects and television broadcasts. In others, it means visits to sheikhs in their tents and - when necessary - it means Predator strikes on high value targets. We can't fight Al Qaeda in sixty countries by ourselves, and so we have to recognize the importance of strengthening relationships and working with foreign governments and security forces.

Sixth -- and finally -- we must prevent local grievances from rising to a global level and drawing small groups of disaffected people into the larger struggle. That's why we need to draw the right connections and recognize how each theater impacts the others.

Obviously -- seen through this lens, invading Iraq was a grave mistake: We diverted resources from Al Qaeda. We failed to differentiate between a secular dictator and religious terrorists and in so doing played directly into Bin Laden's hands. Our own intelligence agencies called our presence in Iraq a "cause celebre" for terrorists worldwide.

And rather than ads about Britney Spears which insult Americans, we ought to have one hell of a debate about this: The Administration misunderstood the facts Đand when it comes to events in Iraq, John McCain continues to misstate those facts and mangle history. We need to set the record straight.

Look, I've known John McCain for years as a fellow Vietnam veteran and a friend. But I just think his recent judgment has been dead wrong. We need to spell out the details here very clearly.

A quick example: as a testament to his superior judgment, John recently declared that the surge -- and I quote -- "began the Anbar Awakening I mean that's just a matter of history." In fact, history shows just the opposite.

Let's look at what happened: tensions between Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Sunni leaders were apparent nearly two years before the surge - culminating in battles in May 2005. Why? Al Qaeda was brutal, disrespectful to tribal sheikhs, and bad for local business.

Colonel Sean MacFarland and his Ready First Brigade arrived in Ramadi in June 2006, with Al Qaeda fully in control, and - on their own - launched an extensive outreach campaign to win over the local population, starting with the local sheikhs. They emphasized getting local police forces out into neighborhoods by deputizing tribal militias. This culminated in September 9, 2006 - four months before the surge was even announced - when a young Sheikh Sittar Albu Risha declared the Anbar Awakening and created the Awakening Council. That created a snowball effect. And, as MacFarland noted, with the 2006 US election approaching "a growing concern that US forces would leave Iraq" made tribal leaders open to our overtures. By late October, nearly every tribe around Ramadi had either joined the Awakening or was openly considering it. As security improved, a major campaign was launched to rebuild Ramadi, culminating in the Ramadi Reconstruction Conference in January 2007.

For those of you keeping score, this is the point in the story where the surge actually begins. Bush announced the surge on January 10th 2007. By the time those troops arrived, Colonel MacFarland had actually rotated out of Iraq.

These aren't small details -- we can't draw the right lessons from the reduction in violence if we don't understand what actually happened: The actions that led to the Awakening reflected our understanding that U.S. military action alone would not defeat the terrorists: we needed to win over the population by co-opting the tribal sheiks, utilizing indigenous security forces, and delivering goods, services and good governance. Moreover, the reduction in violence depended on many other factors -- the sectarian segregation of formerly mixed neighborhoods, Sadr's August 2007 ceasefire, and -- with US military support -- the Iraqi security forces' success in reclaiming the streets of places like Basra from Shi'a militias.

In other words? Not merely "the surge." Not merely more troops. Counterinsurgency. When you say "the surge began the Awakening" you have it exactly backwards and you're drawing all the wrong lessons" in particular that the military can solve what are fundamentally political problems.

That's why I think there's a big choice in this election: McCain is taking a global counterinsurgency and trying to shoehorn it into the old "war on terror" rubric that doesn't do justice to the lessons our troops have learned the hard way.

The big picture is this: winning a war of ideas will not only enable us to defeat the terrorists, but will also restore our ability to affect positive change in other arenas. Let George Bush be remembered for an overly narrow militarized focus on fighting terrorism at the expense of our moral authority and our standing in the world. Let the next President fight terror by emphasizing the best about America to usher in a new paradigm of using force wisely, and in so doing allow us to emerge from this struggle stronger and better able to lead the world into the 21st century.