The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a series of hearing in January and February of this year that sought to lay out what the situation in Iraq was, what the surge of troops into Iraq would mean and how progress would be measured. These hearings had a number of conversations that revealed what the overall benchmarks were for the military strategy.

During the Jan. 18th. SFRC hearing on the foreign/hearings/2007/hrg070111a.html”>SFRC hearing on Jan. 11th of this year had the following exchange with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice about the conditions that had to be met to achieve a political solution to the problems in Iraq. Secretary Rice responded with a list of benchmarks that Iraq had to meet to begin to stabilize the country.

KERRY: I understand what the framework for it is. But the question is: Why is there not the political resolution on the table that assures Americans that the fundamental struggle between Sunni and Shia, and the struggle within Shia—I mean, the president talked last night about this war as if it’s sort of a single war: the green zone government struggling for democracy versus everybody else.

Really, there are several wars.

KERRY: There’s a war Sunni on Shia, there’s a war of Sunni and Shia on American occupiers, there’s a war of Syria, Iran engaging with…

RICE: Senator, I think everybody understands that. But you asked me about the political reconciliation.

KERRY: Well, could you just speak to the political piece please.

RICE: Can I answer? Yes, the political piece. It is composed of the following elements: the national oil law, which is a remarkable law in that it does not take a sectarian cast; a new de- Baathification policy which already has allowed a number of officers to return to the armed forces and pensions to be paid—and there will be further effort on that; a commitment to provincial elections, which the Sunnis feel will be important to righting the disproportionately low share of their representation in provincial councils because they boycotted the elections early on.

These are the elements of a national reconciliation plan. And I don’t think, Senator, it can be imposed from the outside. I do think the Iraqis themselves, with our help and with the help of others - and, by the way, with an international compact where the international community has, indeed, said those are the obligations that you must undertake for support - that that is how they will get to that national reconciliation plan.

But they’re not going to get there if they’re unable to provide population security in Baghdad, because that is soaking the atmosphere of sectarianism.

The Initial Benchmark Assessment Report came out on July 12th. What did it say about these particular benchmarks that were mentioned by the co-author of the surge plan and by Sec. Rice?

Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification reform.

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification reform. This is among the most divisive political issues for Iraq, and compromise will be extremely difficult. Given the lack of satisfactory progress, we have not achieved the desired reconciliation effect that meaningful and broadly accepted de-Ba’athification reform might bring about.

Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources to the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.

Assessment: The current status is unsatisfactory, but it is too early to tell whether the Government of Iraq will enact and implement legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources to all Iraqis. The Government of Iraq has not met its self-imposed goal of May 31 for submitting the framework hydrocarbon and revenue-sharing laws to the COR. Although the KRG and the Shi’a parties have agreed to the text of the Revenue Management Law, Council of Ministers’ approval has been delayed by a Sunni party boycott. The effect of limited progress toward this benchmark has been to reduce the perceived confidence in, and effectiveness of, the Iraqi Government.

Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections.

Assessment: There are multiple components to this benchmark, each deserving its own assessment:

• Establishing the IHEC Commission: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing an IHEC Commission. The Commission has been established.

• Elections Law: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing a provincial elections law. Drafting of the law has just begun.

• Provincial Council Authorities: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing provincial council authorities. The COR is working on legislation, which has had its second reading; however, the COR committee continues to work on revisions to the draft law, and it remains unclear when the legislation will come to a third and final vote by the full COR.

• Provincial Elections Date: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing a date for provincial elections. Legislation required for setting the date has not been enacted.

Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions.

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions. The regions law has been passed. Implementation of this legislation should take place after provincial elections are held and after the passage of an updated elections law. The procedures are in place, but whether establishment of additional regions (in addition to the already-recognized KRG) is desirable depends on a number of factors, including the outcome of efforts at constitutional reform. The progress toward this benchmark has been satisfactory, and the effect is that this potentially contentious issue has not been a source of discord.

Of the four benchmarks presented to the SFRC in January and identified as critical to success in Iraq, the assessment is three are unsatisfactory and one is progressing. No further comment is necessary.

Thanks to Karen Corbman for her research efforts on this post.