The Problem With Pakistan

Pakistan is one of our staunchest allies in the global war against terror. At least that’s what those in the White House keep telling us. Then why are the Taliban and al-Qaeda regaining their power and becoming more comfortably entrenched in their Pakistan strongholds every day?

Part of the problem is political — Pakistan is a complex country with many competing constituencies, and President Pervez Musharraf has to maintain a very delicate balance among multiple factions in order to stay in power. It’s the sixth most populous country in the world (the second largest with a Muslim majority), and there is a long history of conflicts between its various tribal, social, and ethnic groups.

Part of the problem is geographical — Pakistan is a large country in a difficult location, sharing its borders with Afghanistan and Iran in the west, India in the east and China in the far northeast. Its 500-mile-long border with Afghanistan is particularly porous due to its extremely rugged terrain and the local tribes’ long history of resisting interference by outsiders in that region.

Part of the problem is economic — the tribal regions of northwestern Pakistan are among the poorest areas of the world, and the only sources of income for the residents there are smuggling, drugs, and the Taliban/al-Qaeda insurgency operations. Musharraf’s government relies heavily upon the billions of dollars in aid it receives from the U.S., but its economic clout is still stretched very thin in many parts of the country.

Part of the problem is cultural/religious—the Pakistani government is engaged in a bitter, intense struggle with hard-line Islamic extremists on the one hand and those pushing for greater social and democratic freedoms on the other. In the northwest border areas in particular, the only functioning social structure is tribal and the only available education is in the strongly anti-Western Islamist madrassahs.

Musharraf and his government are in a very precarious position in Pakistan. He had to survive numerous assassination attempts while trying to clamp down on a nationalist insurgency in the province of Baluchistan and militant uprisings in the breakaway tribal regions. While he has to maintain a strong relationship with the Bush administration in order to keep receiving military and financial aid from the U.S., he also has to maintain a second parallel track of internal political accommodation with the competing forces that threaten to tear apart his country and bring down his unstable government.

Despite the billions of dollars that the Bush administration has poured into Pakistan to help shore up Musharraf’s position, the White House has been increasingly frustrated by our Pakistani ally’s inability to keep out the Taliban and destroy the al-Qaeda strongholds along its border with Afghanistan. In recent days the U.S. has been ramping up its rhetoric and has threatened not just airstrikes against Al Qaeda inside Pakistan, but sending ground troops into the country to take on the insurgents directly as well.

Senator Kerry has always insisted that the Bush administration erred greatly in diverting its focus away from Afghanistan in order to pursue its failed policy of invading Iraq under false pretenses. He has made it quite clear over the last five years that the U.S. needs to concentrate on dealing with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Osama bin Laden in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions where they are comfortably entrenched rather than letting itself get trapped in a no-win quagmire in Iraq.

Senator Kerry has sponsored and cosponsored several different pieces of legislation dealing specifically with the question of how to deal with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and this week he will be chairing hearings for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee focusing on the Bush administration’s plans for taking the fight to the insurgents where they actually are. As he said in a statement released earlier today,

Just last week we were reminded of the glaring reality that al-Qaeda is regrouping and growing stronger in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The new NIE report had better be a long overdue wakeup call about the importance of fighting terrorism where the terrorists are — in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Just as this administration took its eye off the ball after 9/11 and failed to capture or kill Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora when we had him surrounded, now the war in Iraq has diverted attention from the fight against those who attacked us on 9/11.

Our troops in Iraq have made us all proud, and they have done their job. Now it’s time for Iraqi politicians to stop squabbling and bring about the political solution necessary to end the violence there. No matter how much lip service the administration pays to taking the offensive on terrorism, we must be smarter and stronger in our hunt for the terrorists by recommitting to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and by having a smart strategy for diplomacy and redeployment in Iraq, denying extremists what has been their best recruiting tool.

On Wednesday I will chair a hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee to question Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nick Burns about the administration’s plan for Pakistan — and help push the debate about how we can successfully reengage in the fight there.

Yes, Pakistan is problematic. But the problems with Pakistan can only be solved by addressing them directly, rather than by sweeping them aside in order to chase chimeras in Iraq.

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